Four mistakes: Bears’ coach Matt Eberflus has some explaining to do after Hail Mary meltdown

Matt Eberflus went 10-24 in his first two years as head coach of the Chicago Bears.

This season the team was entering a new era — out with quarterback Justin Fields, in with quarterback Caleb Williams, who the Bears took with the No. 1 overall pick. Ownership believed enough in Eberflus to give him more time to show he is a championship level coach.

And maybe Eberflus proves to be just that.

If he does, he will have to overcome — quickly — Sunday’s late-game coaching and team execution meltdown that didn’t just lead to an 18-15 loss to Washington and didn’t just drop the Bears to 4-3 on the season, but has the potential to linger in the locker room and define the season.

Eberflus needs to make sure the final two plays of the loss don’t define his coaching career.

To recap, Washington had the ball, first and 10, on their own 35-yard-line with just six seconds remaining with no time outs. Chicago led, 15-11, so Washington needed a touchdown.

The Commanders were too far from the end zone for a Hail Mary but had just enough time remaining to grab 8, 10, 12 yards and get out of bounds and try a final heave.

Chicago went into Hail Mary coverage anyway, ceding the short sideline, which Washington offensive coordinator Kliff Kingsbury and quarterback Jayden Daniels seized on. They got the ball to Terry McLaurin on the left sideline for 13 yards in four seconds. Now they were on the edge of Hail Mary range — their own 48 — with two seconds remaining.

Eberflus after the game shrugged the decision to not defend the short sideline, as many teams do.

“You’re defending touchdown there,” the coach said. “And them throwing the ball for 13 yards or 10 yards, whatever that is, doesn’t really matter. It’s always going to come down to that last play.”

Those 13 yards were important, though, because Daniels can’t chuck a ball 75-80 yards — as would’ve been previously required. The dismissal of the importance is undermined by Eberflus standing on the sideline before the snap, waving for a cornerback to move up, rather than defend 60 yards down field.

Chicago had three timeouts as well and could have used one to readjust the defense. Instead the Bears conceded the field position.

Then came the final play where the following mistakes were made:

1. Rushing just three defenders. This allowed Washington to double team every pass rusher and allowed Daniels to move around in the pocket and buy 13 seconds — 13! — for his receivers not just get all the way down the field but actually adjust and be able to all coalesce around the eventual pass.

Just a week prior, Detroit faced a similar situation — Minnesota had the ball on its own 45 and needed a miracle heave. Lions coach Dan Campbell rushed five — including three from the left side to force Vikings right-handed quarterback Sam Darnold to move to his left and make any potential throw difficult. Not that it mattered, Darnold was quickly sacked before any Viking receiver could get anywhere near the end zone.

Detroit won.

2. Having a spy on Daniels. Chicago actually had a fourth defender stay near the line of scrimmage and only dropped seven defensive backs. However, linebacker T.J. Edwards never rushed and instead appeared to be playing contain on Daniels. Was there a worry that Daniels might scramble 52 yards — past seven Bears downfield?

Why not either rush four or drop eight? You either force two one-on-one pass rush scenarios — instead of none — or get another body in the end zone that may have prevented this disaster.

Instead, the Bears essentially played 10 on 11.

3. Tyrique Stevenson. The cornerback was seen with his back to the play, taunting Washington fans before the ball was snapped.

Is it a lot to ask of a head coach to see that, call time out and get everyone refocused? Perhaps, but this is the NFL.

He actually continued doing that for four seconds of the play, leaving him distracted and out of position by the time the ball arrived at the goal line.

“To Chicago and teammates my apologies for lack of awareness and focus,” Stevenson wrote on social media. “The game ain’t over until zeros hit the clock. Can’t take anything for granted. Notes taken, improvement will happen.”

At least Stevenson took his share of the blame. The head coach, who might also have pounded those “notes” into the team’s head before the game, still hasn’t.

4. Positioning. Eberflus was confused at how the coverage broke down. Washington had three receivers converge on the pass, which came down about the 2-yard line. They had another receiver a few yards in front of that scrum in case the ball was batted forward and one — Brown — a few yards behind in case it caromed in that direction.

This is a pretty standard Hail Mary play. Except Chicago double covered the front man and sent five players into the mass of humanity, leaving Brown all alone in the end zone.

Eberflus said Monday that it was Stevenson, the fan-interacting defensive back, who was supposed to do deep contain (ie. cover Brown).

“We’ve practiced that play 100 times since we’ve been here,” Eberflus said. “And again, I’ll have to look at what the execution was of that, but we have a body on the body boxing guys out, like basketball at the very end. We have one guy that’s the rim that knocks the ball down. We got a back tip guy that goes behind the pile.”

They clearly need to practice for the 101th time. Or Eberflus needed to use a timeout to remind them. Either way the knives are out among Bears fans and if Eberflus is going to last in Chicago, he needs to make sure the mood and morale in the locker room isn’t the same.

“Our guys believe in each other, trust in each other, have faith in each other,” Eberflus said. “They’re a resilient bunch. They’re going to come back more determined.”

He better hope so.